The German Left and Israel

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Abstract

Within society and public discourse, antisemitism is still perceived as emanating predominantly from the political Right. However, reactions to the Six-Day War in 1967 demonstrated the falsity of this assumption. Anti-Zionist attitudes spread in German public discourse, notably among the New Left.

Although the left attempts to distance itself from antisemitism, it nevertheless justifies the reproduction of traditional antisemitic stereotypes (e.g. the greedy Jewish capitalist) and the use of antisemitic metaphors (e.g. plague of locusts) through the following two demonizing maneuvers:

One, Israel has been associated since the late 1960s with ideologies the left clearly rejects: colonialism and imperialism, oppression, militarism, and chauvinism. The left has always positioned itself on the side of the weak fighting the mighty. In the context of the Mideast conflict, this means showing solidarity with the Palestinians. Based on such a perspective, Israel has been continuously blamed as the cruel and mighty oppressor. Leftists have seen Israel as the bridgehead for the United States into the Arab world, and partly interpret American support as the expression of the alleged Jewish global power.

Two, parts of the German left have declared Israelis as the “new Nazis” and compare the Mideast Conflict to the Holocaust. Through such demonizing analogies, German atrocities become trivialized and identification with the German in-group can take place. Additionally, when claiming that the Mideast conflict resembles Nazi atrocities, Germans tend to emphasize their sensitivity regarding their own history and, as a result, feel morally superior. This leads to the birth of “honorable antisemitism”, wrapped in anti-Zionist reproaches.

The way in which such distorted perspectives on Israel and the Mideast conflict are uttered depends to a large extent on the motives and the background of the speaker. Whilst the far-left depicts Israel and Jews as colonialists and imperialists, center-left milieus see themselves as advocates for human rights, eloquently advising the secularization of Israel and the abandonment of Zionism. Both groups however charge Israel with a backward and immoral behavior and the status of a pariah.

Its “rhetorical flexibility”\(^2\) makes this form of hatred towards Israel so attractive to the mainstream society. Speakers distance themselves from conventional forms of antisemitism, emphasizing – based on their ideological position – that it is impossible for them to hold prejudices against Jews. Antisemitism in this form is presented as legitimate criticism of Israel while at the same time the taboo of criticizing the Jewish state (another antisemitic stereotype) is emphasized. Left Israel-related antisemitism can then be embraced by the mainstream; its social acceptability makes it much more dangerous than the limited appeal of traditional forms of Jew-hatred.

### 1. Introduction

Science and the broad public tend to perceive antisemitism as a constitutive component of a right-wing world-view. Since the 1990s and especially since the second Intifada (2000) though, antisemitism in the left political sphere has become a de-facto part of the discourse as well, too. Related discussions in the public, throughout different left groups, but also in academia can be characterized as being highly emotional. The reason for this might be that antisemitism within the leftist worldview still sounds oxymoronic, i.e. antisemitism on the left is opposed to the self-conception of left groups.

Since antisemitism on the left must be perceived within the context of anti-Zionism, I will first clarify the latter term. This, in turn, requires the understanding of what left milieus mean when they use the term *Zionism*. The meanings of terms shift throughout history. Only through consideration of the ideological background as well as the historical genesis of these phenomena (see chapter 3), current patterns of language use (including their communicative functions) can be understood and classified as being expressions of antisemitism in the left political sphere (see chapter 4).

### 2. Terminology

Wide parts of the left saw (and still see) Zionism as a reactionary ideology that propagates an “incompatibility between Jews and non-Jews”\(^3\). Through such an interpretation of Zionism as a backward nationalism, it is perceived as an obstacle for the leftist aspiration of overcoming


nation statehood and establishing a classless society. In light of the historical reasons for the emergence of Zionism, such a conception decontextualizes the Zionist movement and relativises antisemitism.

Anti-Zionism is an ideology, which is opposed to the alleged character of Zionism and aims at overcoming the Zionist movement. The hostility toward Israel is placed within the core of the ideology. In chapter 3, I will elucidate the elements that constitute anti-Zionism and its historical genesis.

Often people emphasize that there is a difference between anti-Zionism and antisemitism. From a historical perspective, the two phenomena are of course not identical, since they originate from different ideological standpoints. A differentiation can therefore be legitimate when looking at an early historical stage. However, considering the genesis as well as current patterns and actualizations of both phenomena, a differentiation does not meet the characteristic of antisemitism, which is to continuously – and in accordance with own values and principles – adapt to present conditions. During long parts of its historical existence as well as in its current shape, anti-Zionism can rather be characterized as a "synonym" of antisemitism:

4 Further on, I will indicate that a left world-view does by no means exclude nationalism and the construction of per se good peoples (e.g. standing up against the finance capital).
In addition, left-liberal elites repeatedly raise the claim that nationalism in its extreme form has been vanquished in Western Europe and especially in Germany—while Zionism, however, remains to be a relict of nationalist tendencies in Europe’s past (regarding post-national self-images among European elites cf. A. S. Markovits, “Europäischer Antiamerikanismus und Antisemitismus: Immer gegenwärtig, obwohl immer verleugnet,” Exklusive Solidarität: Linker Antisemitismus in Deutschland: Vom Idealismus zur Antiglobalisierungsbewegung, ed. M. Brosch et al. (Berlin: Metropol, 2007), 241).

5 Zionism has its political roots in the end of the 19th century and got huge reputation with Theodor Herzl’s writing „Der Judenstaat” from 1896. As a reaction on increasing antisemitism, the declared aim of the Zionist movement was the founding or reconstitution of a Jewish national state in Palestine (cf. T. Stein, Zwischen Anti-Semitismus und Israelkritik: Antizionismus in der deutschen Linke? (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2011), 28). Relativising antisemitism among left groups however started even before they dealt out criticism against Zionism (see chapter 3).


7 With regards to the definition of antisemitism: “Antisemitism as a mental system of belief and of interpretation of the world has been passed down through the centuries, always adapted to current conditions and correspondingly modified, yet without changes in the underlying conceptual constants, according to which Jews categorically function as THE OTHER. […] In antisemites’ mentally fixed binary construction of the world, Judaism figures as the ultimate opposite of their own form of existence. Accordingly Jews, with the imagined characteristics imputed to them, embody that which is categorically non-normal and bad. Antisemitism thus signifies exclusion of Jews and Judaism by labeling them as the absolute and total negation of the world order defined as normal.” (M. Schwarz-Friesel and J. Reinharz, Inside the Antisemitic Mind: The Language of Jew-Hatred in Contemporary Germany (Boston: University Press of New England, 2017), 18p.). With regards to the definition of verbal antisemitism: “All linguistic utterances that devalue, stigmatize, discriminate against, and defame Jews qua Jews can be considered forms of verbal antisemitism. These are utterances, in other words, that can be coded as stereotypes hostile toward Jews and that are used to transmit resentments.” (M. Schwarz-Friesel and J. Reinharz, Inside the Antisemitic Mind: The Language of Jew-Hatred in Contemporary Germany, 19).

Anti-Zionism solely superficially appears to be an attitude on its own. In reality, it simply is a new form of latent antisemitism in disguise that in contrast to passed on hostility toward Jews has less a religious but rather a political and economic basis.\(^9\)

Particularly in its goal of destroying the state of Israel, which nowadays is the “most important symbol of Jewish life and survival”\(^10\), the synonymous, however socially acceptable status of anti-Zionism becomes apparent:

Contemporary anti-Zionism, which rejects or delegitimizes the existence of the Jewish state, functions to a great extent “as a ticket for the traditional hostility toward Jews, and its ultima ratio is the annihilation of Israel”.\(^11\)

According to the characterization of anti-Zionism as a „ticket” for traditional antisemitism, Haury (2005) stresses that the anti-imperialism of the left – that with respect to the Mideast (Conflict) comes along as anti-Zionism – shows antisemitic patterns:

The anti-imperialist world-view of the New Left was shaped by Manichaeism, personification, conspiracy theory and the opposition to good ‘peoples’ versus the bad finance capital and therefore it was structurally antisemitic [...].\(^12\)

Applying the linguistic approach to the present-day antisemitism, Schwarz-Friesel/Reinharz (2017) also emphasize that both phenomena must be seen as closely related on the linguistic level. They therefore categorize anti-Zionism as subtype of Israel-related antisemitism respectively of anti-Israelism:\(^13\)

[...] because anti-Israelism and anti-Zionism are often inextricably linked and because usually no linguistic distinction is made, we subsume this variant under anti-Israelism.\(^14\)

Anti-Zionism, in large parts of its historical, and almost completely in its present-day shape is tainted with antisemitic elements. Its purpose is the one of an identity-forming feature, a „cultural code”\(^15\). This facilitates the affiliation to a particular cultural milieu in which the reproduction of antisemitic stereotypes is the expression of illegitimate attitudes. Through the loop

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of anti-Zionism, antisemitic stereotypes and other forms of Israel-related antisemitism can be justified and finally can reach the status of what is permissible to say. Related interpretations of global states and processes get reinforced through diverse Anti-isms that constitute a simplified, „one-dimensional world-view”, to be especially characterized by a distorting dichotomy between the good and the evil.

3. Genesis of left-wing antisemitism

Hostility toward Jews among the left had already existed even before Israel was founded. Hence, it cannot be limited to the time frame after 1945. Hostility toward Jews is the oldest hatred in human history and has for centuries constituted an integral characteristic of European culture, which could (and still can) be observed among all social groups. Even philosophers of the Enlightenment in the 18th century such as Voltaire, Kant and Fichte as well as leading representatives of the labour movement and theoreticians of socialism such as Karl Marx expressed antisemitic attitudes. In addition, examples including the early socialists such as Charles Fourrier and Pierre J. Proudhon, Russian anarchists such as Michail Bakunin and others, the Stalinist show trials, and the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) of the Weimar Republic shall be mentioned. Calls, particularly the one from central committee

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16 Cf. EUMC, Working Definition Of Antisemitism.
17 Next to anti-Zionism, anti-Americanism, anti-capitalism, anti-modernism, anti-militarism as well as anti-imperialism constitute a self-contained model of interpreting the world.
21 Whether Marx was really an antisemite, is being thoroughly debated among scientists. It is a fact that he (as well as many other leftists) also criticized antisemitism. Stein (2011) indicates that “such statements [...] were” less the reflection of a genuinely left antisemitism from a specifically left-minded model for interpreting the world, but rather, due to macro social structures of prejudice that could also affect left-wing patterns of judgement. A socialist or a person believing in the ideals of Enlightenment was therefore not automatically immune to the adoption of anti-Jewish prejudices” (T. Stein, Zwischen Antisemitismus und Israelkritik: Antizionismus in der deutschen Linken? 81p.; cf. also H. Brunkhorst, Die falsch gestellte Frage: War Marx Antisemit? (Blätter, 08/2014)).
(ZK) member, Ruth Fischer, in 1923, to resist the “capitalist Jews” by “hanging” them on lanterns and “trampling”\textsuperscript{23} them, demonstrate the explicit nature, with which antisemitism was expressed in left milieus at the beginning of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century.

The term \textit{anti-Zionism} is originally disconnected from such forms of left-wing antisemitism. It can be found, amongst others, in Jewish minorities and illustrates the – by no means uniform, very heterogeneous and widespread – attitude of many European Jews regarding the pursuit of Zionism for a Jewish homeland. Especially the Jews, who represented principles of emancipation and assimilation in their respective European civil societies, were opposed to this pursuit in particular.\textsuperscript{24} In Germany, it was the liberal \textit{Centralverein deutscher Staatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens} (\textit{Central Association of German Citizens of Jewish Faith}) that sought to enforce civic as well as equal rights for Jews, emphasize the loyalty of German Jews toward Germany and strengthen the Jewish self-confidence. The Centralverein rejected the Zionist belief in a Jewish nation with its own history, culture and future. Also, orthodox Jews opposed Zionism, as it demanded the return to the holy land of Israel before the arrival of the Messiah. The \textit{Allgemeiner Jüdischer Arbeiterbund} (\textit{General Jewish Labour Bund in Lithuania, Poland and Russia}, generally called \textit{The Bund}) in East Europe was the most prominent anti-Zionist movement of the Jewish left – here, Zionism was rejected as bourgeois and therefore reactionary Jewish nationalism.\textsuperscript{25}

The rejection of Zionism represented a dominant attitude, also in non-Jewish leftist groups. Here, Zionism was characterized as backward and competing with the socialist movement. However, the rejection of Jewish nationalism had its basis in a constant underestimation of antisemitism – hatred toward Jews was meant to be eliminated in the course of the planned revolution anyway.\textsuperscript{26}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{2} S. Volkov, \textit{Antisemitismus als kultureller Code: Zehn Essays}, 77 pp.
\bibitem{4} Cf. P. Ullrich, \textit{Die Linke, Israel und Palästina: Nahostdiskurse in Großbritannien und Deutschland} (Berlin: Dietz, 2008), 84.
\end{thebibliography}
Anti-Zionism before Auschwitz must be distinguished from the Marxist-Leninist anti-Zionism of the late Stalinism.\(^{27}\) The latter is based on an anti-imperialist world-view and arose mainly in the realm of power of Stalin’s Soviet Union.\(^{28}\) It represents a continuation of an anti-Zionist bias that characterized the relation of certain parts of the left with concerns to Judaism, already before the Middle East conflict erupted. This emerging anti-Zionism exhibited a structural, contextual and functional proximity with antisemitic views (not least through the reproduction of stereotypes), even though mostly lacking an otherwise ‘traditional,’ racist component\(^ {29}\) – conceptually, this “anti-Zionism after Auschwitz”\(^ {30}\) considered itself to be antifascist and, thus, had to avoid any antisemitic connotation. From then on, this early form of anti-Zionism has had an impact on other left-wing groups outside of the Soviet Union.

In the German Democratic Republic (DDR) that defined itself as antifascist and anti-imperialist, anti-Zionism was part of the state-approved propaganda.\(^ {31}\) Israel was characterized as a “spearhead of the imperialist camp,”\(^ {32}\) Zionism as an “anomaly” of capitalist imperialism,\(^ {33}\) as a devastating demon as well as the case-example of colonialism. This led to a socially acceptable anti-Zionist outlook, which was in accordance with then-hegemonic perceptions in society. The anti-Zionist propaganda was steadily fed with antisemitic content, especially after the Six-Day War in 1967. It received a special place in an ideology that equated Zionism not only with nationalism, but also with economic expansionism.

By construing the state of Israel as regional henchman of US imperialism, the alleged symbiosis of these two states could be presented as the root of all evil. Allegations such as “global conspiracy of […] Wall street capitalists” as well as a dichotomization between “working


\(^ {28}\) This Marxist-Leninist anti-imperialism is an ideological element of Marxism stemming from Lenin that also reached the left in Germany in a rather dogmatic manifestation. It has to be distinguished from anti-imperialism in a broader sense that rejects all forms of occupation and colonialism (cf. Cf. P. Ullrich, Die Linke, Israel und Palästina: Nahostdiskurse in Großbritannien und Deutschland, 42; T. Stein, Zwischen Antisemitismus und Israelkritik: Antizionismus in der deutschen Linken? 29; S. Salzborn, Kampf der Ideen: Die Geschichte politischer Theorien im Kontext (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2017).


\(^ {33}\) L. Mertens, “Antizionismus: Feindschaft gegen Israel als eine neue Form des Antisemitismus.” Antisemitismus in Deutschland: Zur Aktualität eines Vorurteils, 89.
nations” and “financial hyenas and parasites” not only confirmed the antisemitic stereotypes, but also raised the persuasive potential of such demonization. In this world-view, Jews and/or Zionists served as scapegoats – albeit the GDR actually strove for overcoming the discrimination of humans, based on their affiliation with a certain group. With the aid of such rhetorical constructions, a collective identity was to be created and the new ruling system was hence justified – the latter was necessary, in the face of countless problems, which occurred during the formation of socialism. In addition, the obsessive comparison between Zionism and National Socialism can be classified as exonerative antisemitism, fulfilling the need for relief and exculpation from the Nazi crimes (cf. chapter 4).

The vast majority of the West German left, however, can be characterized as pro-Israel, partly even philosemitic, during the 1950s to the mid-1960s. Such attitudes can be partially explained by the knowledge and the shame regarding the Shoah. Strong enthusiasm for the progressive pioneer state with its socialist kibbutzim existed both within the social democratic as well as the Christian left. This promptly changed with the Six-Day War in 1967, triggering an exhaustive erosion of solidarity among the leftist groups, who now considered themselves as anti-imperialist. The fact that Israel could preventively defend itself against an imminent attack from the Arab states represented a “sin” within “the leftist logic of categor-

37 Regarding the genesis of antisemitism among the West German left, see specifically the comprehensive studies by M. W. Kloke, Israel und die deutsche Linke: Zur Geschichte eines schwierigen Verhältnisses and L. Rensmann, Demokratie und Judenbild: Antisemitismus in der politischen Kultur der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2004).
40 Cf. T. Haury, Antisemitismus von links: Kommunistische Ideologie, Nationalismus und Antizionismus in der frühen DDR.
ical solidarity with the victims." Moreover, conservative milieus increasingly expressed sympathy with Israel, which led to a change of thinking among the leftist groups.

The (more and more antisemitic) ideology of anti-Zionism (in connection with anti-Americanism) represented a completely natural component for the arising New Left during the 1970s up until the end of the 1980s in West Germany. Israel, the concept of the enemy, became the nexus that brought a “political-ideological closing of ranks” for the disunited left.

Ever since, it is of particular concern for the left to demonstrate solidarity with the Palestinians and to support the fight of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) against Israel. Introduced by the Socialist German Student Federation (SDS), the Extra-Parliamentary Opposition (APO), the civil rights movement and the 1968 movement, leftist groups established many Palestine Committees from the 1970s onwards. Unlike traditionally left movements, these leftists put their hopes to overthrow capitalist systems via the so-called national liberation movements in the “third world”, i.e. in Africa, Asia, South America, and primarily in the Mideast. The focus on these non-European movements served as identification objects and allowed an unambiguous and therefore persuasive dichotomisation between the rulers and the ruled – a reduced perception of political and economic processes that stressed their worldview. After the unsuccessful attempt by the APO to trigger revolutionary impulses in West Germany, this was a crucial step towards self-legitimization.

In accordance with a fraternization with as well as pure romanticization of fighting peoples as well as by “applying the anti-imperialist scheme to the [Middle East] conflict,” Israel was demonized and delegitimized in numerous left-wing publications, claiming that it is a “Zionist aggressor state,” a “bridgehead of US imperialism,” an “oppressor of Arabic peoples’ liberation efforts” or an “artificial entity built on stolen land and with scrounged money,” show-

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42 C. Globisch, Radikaler Antisemitismus: Inklusions- und Exklusionssemantiken von links und rechts in Deutschland, 44.
44 The New Left was constituted by the Socialist German Student Federation (SDS), the Extra-Parliamentary Opposition (APO), the subsequently following or seceding groups (comprising also the Maoist K-Groups), the Urban Guerilleros as well as the emerging ecological movement and the political party The Greens.
45 L. Rensmann, Demokratie und Judenbild: Antisemitismus in der politischen Kultur der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 299.
47 The SDS was the 1961 founded hotbed of the New Left, which was the first to dissociate itself from the Socialist-Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) drifting to the right.
48 Cf. T. Haury, Die ideologischen Grundlagen des Antizionismus in der Linken.
50 These included back then and in the following decades amongst others the daily newspaper junge Welt, leaflets of various Mideast groups, the publications Rote Fahne, Linksruck, and Rote Presse Korrespondenz.
ing a “parasitic character”. Applying this explanatory (and strongly evaluative) scheme, almost all political conflicts were related to Israel (and Jews). The latter were insofar described as the absolute evil. In the end, this led to a point where anti-Zionism became – also in West Germany – a model for interpreting the world.

The above-mentioned utterances coming from the left milieus in those days, point once again to the questionability of separating anti-Zionism from antisemitism. The latter could be observed on the basis of not only the language use, but also of concrete actions by the leftist protagonists: the attack on the Jewish community house in West Berlin on November 9th, 1969 by the Tupamaros of West Berlin (which was justified with the aforementioned argumentation) proves how much the rejection of Israel was tainted with antisemitism. Besides this act of terrorism, further incidents of the 1960s and 1970s included the arson attack on a nursing home in the Jewish community in Munich, the sympathetic responses of the Red Army Faction (RAF) and other groups with regards to the assassination of Israeli athletes during the Olympic Games in Munich in 1972 by the Palestinian Black September Organization, the hijacking of an Air France airplane by Palestinian (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)) and German (representatives of the Revolutionary Cells) terrorists in July 1976.

During the Lebanon War in 1982, Israel was continuously accused of committing genocide. Meanwhile, particularly among the German left, comparisons between Israel and Nazi Germany became more and more noticeable (e.g. through allusions such as “final solution to the Palestinian question,” for its function and linguistic patterns see chapter 4).

56 After touchdown in the Ugandan city of Entebbe, the passengers were separated into Jewish and non-Jewish groups and the non-Jewish hostages were released. The only hostage that was killed tragically was a concentration camp survivor (cf. V. Weiß, “Die antizionistische Rezeption des Nahostkonflikts in der militanten Linken der BRD,” Tel Avivter Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte XXXIII: Antisemitismus, Antizionismus, Israelkritik (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2005), 231; T. Stein, Zwischen Antisemitismus und Israelkritik: Antizionismus in der deutschen Linken? 52).
A first turning point, i.e. problematization of the antisemitic content of such statements among the left could be witnessed in the 1980s. This “time of tensile testing and learning processes” were even further intensified in the 1990s, specifically during the Gulf War in 1991. The prominent outlook in large parts of the left at that time (trivializing the dictator Saddam Hussein, characterizing the US as belligerent as well as ignoring the concrete danger of war for Israel) led to the separation of the so-called Antideutschen (anti-Germans) from the anti-imperialist core (which continued to represent the classic anti-Zionist position). Hence, a fundamental shift in perspective happened within single groups within the left milieu in Germany, both regarding the Middle East conflict as well as the antisemitism. Since then, left-wing antisemitism was recognized within its own ranks and publicly discussed. The Antideutschen considered antisemitism in Germany to be widespread and of eliminatory character since the “Jew” as bogeyman shows a constitutive meaning for the ideological construction of the “German people”. The extermination of the Jews by the Nazis, thus, has to be considered as the negative climax of both the civil society as well as the “German nation”.

Auschwitz is no longer regarded as merely the crimes of National Socialism but particularly as the German crime. Additionally, the Antideutschen clearly rejected the reunification of Germany due to a threatening hegemonic positioning of the German state. Members of this group comprehend Zionism as response to the European antisemitism and defend, amongst


59 Mouthpieces of the political camp of the Antideutschen amongst others were the weekly newspaper Jungle World (dissociated from the junge Welt) as well as the magazines Bahamas and konkret.


61 For a detailed analysis concerning the separation of the left spectrum in the Federal Republic of Germany cf. also J. Gerber, Nie wieder Deutschland? Die Linke im Zusammenbruch des “realen Sozialismus” (Freiburg: ça ira, 2010); P. Nowak, Kurze Geschichte der Antisemitismusdebatte in der deutschen Linken (Münster: edition assemblage, 2013).

62 These developments of reorientation within certain left-wing groups were already anticipated through the debates about the Lebanon War 1982, but also through the impulses originating from the “historians quarrel” and the Jenninger speech (cf. T. Haury, “Der neue Antisemitismusstreit der deutschen Linken,” Neuer Antisemitismus? Eine globale Debatte, 145). However, in the 1990s – not so far from the inception of the Gulf War – the commencing Oslo peace process must be mentioned, which, in its turn, led to a shift and easing of the dispute over Israel among the left. Yet, this period of calm rapidly ended with the outbreak of the Second Intifada in September 2000 (cf. M. W. Kloke, “Antizionismus und Antisemitismus als Weltanschauung? Tendenzen im deutschen Linksradikalismus und -extremismus,” Extremismus in Deutschland: Erscheinungsformen und aktuelle Bestandsaufnahme, 180).

others, the existence of Israel as a crucial shelter for all Jews.63 This conflict, among the left, was about
the relation towards Israel and the Mideast conflict, the meaning of the Shoah for the present, attitudes toward antisemitism, nationalism and the German past, the question of anti-capitalism and anti-imperialism, the relation towards war and peace and the relevance of international solidarity. It is, to sum it up, about the identity of the radical left in Germany after 1989.64

The critical reflection on left-wing antisemitism that started in the 1990s admittedly did not lead to the termination of anti-Zionist distortions of Israel. During the second intifada (2000) and the Lebanon War 2006 (and 2009), antisemitic stereotypes were reproduced again through the loop of anti-Zionism. Newspapers such as junge Welt, Neues Deutschland, and Unsere Zeit reconfirmed a continuous virulence of anti-imperialist, anti-Zionist patterns of the (radical to the extreme) left.65

Looking at rather left-oriented media within the German mainstream illustrates that Israel-related antisemitism in this milieu also does not represent an individual case (and cannot at all – as often suggested – be considered a taboo). Right after its foundation in 1948, the renowned publisher of the newspaper Die Zeit, Marion Gräfin Dönhoff, already classified Israel as comparable with Nazi Germany.66 Also Rudolf Augstein drew this analogy in his Spiegel articles of the 1970s and 1990s.67 Jakob Augstein, stepson of the popular publisher and editor-in-chief of the left-liberal Freitag, in recent history continued this tradition in his Spiegel columns by repeatedly comparing Israel with Nazi Germany (“Gaza is a prison. A camp”68). Fur-

63 Ibid. 152pp.
64 Ibid. 144.
66 “One can only hope what the shock regarding the death of Count Bernadotte means for the responsible men of the government of Israel, that they pause at least for a moment and recognize appalled how far they have already come on their way that has led another nation into the abyss.” (M. Gräfin Dönhoff, Völkerlicher Ordensstaat Israel (Die Zeit, 23.09.1948), 1).
67 “It must not be the same people, that seek to engrain the remembrance of the platform in Auschwitz forever into the memory of us and the ones that come after us [...], to act as the ‘master race’ toward the Palestinians” (R. Augstein, Ist Israel noch zu retten? (Der Spiegel, 15.10.1990)).
thermore, J. Augstein equated the Jewish state with the South African apartheid regime,69 alleged intentional killing of Palestinian children by the Israeli army and claimed that ultra-orthodox Jews would “follow the law of revenge”.70 The journalist also reproduced world conspiracy ideologies (“[… the Netanyahu government keeps the whole world on a leash with rising war hymns”, “[… the whole world as a hostage […]”)71; “when Jerusalem calls, Berlin obeys its will”.72 The fact that a major part of German journalists defended Jakob Augstein against the antisemitism allegations of the Wiesenthal Center – despite his obviously demonizing statements – confirms the social acceptability of antisemitic slurs within the German mainstream discourse. The central argument in the debates was that Augstein would represent critical, left-wing journalism and, therefore, his articles cannot represent expressions of antisemitic thinking. This debate exemplifies “a removal of taboos, a rationalisation and a legitimization of antisemitic stereotypes”73. The Augstein case demonstrates that the conditions for such statements change if they are expressed by left-liberal elites – positively connoted and chosen opinion leaders of the German political mainstream.74

The highest circulating German daily newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung also reproduced antisemitic stereotypes in form of illustrations. Two scandals took place in 2013 and 2014: in one of them, they published a cartoon that depicts Israel as a monster, which is served by a woman representing Germany.75 In the second case, they released a cartoon showing Facebook founder, Mark Zuckerberg, as an octopus with a hooked nose, incorporating the application WhatsApp.76 Even if such cartoons were rejected even beyond the antisemitic paradigm, its presence nonetheless demonstrates one more time that antisemitic imagery might be observed in left-liberal mainstream media as soon as journalists refer to Israel and/or Jewish persons. Because of their potential impact on opinions within wider mainstream society, the presence

71 J. Augstein, Es musste gesagt werden (Spiegel Online, 06.04.2012).
72 J. Augstein, Die deutsche Atom-Lüge (Spiegel Online, 04.06.2012).
of such images is even more dangerous in this media spectrum than in decidedly left-wing press.\footnote{For a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the image of Israel within the German mainstream media, see R. Beyer, \textit{Mit deutschem Blick: Israelkritische Berichterstattung über den Nahostkonflikt in der bundesrepublikanischen Qualitätspresse. Eine Inhaltsanalyse mit linguistischem Schwerpunkt von Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung und Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, Die Welt und Welt am Sonntag, Nürnberger Nachrichten, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Die Zeit, Focus und Der Spiegel}. (Bremen: edition lumière, 2016).}

On the political level, the behaviour of politicians from the party DIE LINKE (The Left) have provoked various scandals in the past 25 years, leading to debates on antisemitism in the party.\footnote{For a detailed overview of antisemitism in the party DIE LINKE, which constitutes the successor party of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED)), cf. M. W. Kloke, “Antisemitismus in der Linkspartei: ‘DIE LINKE hat ein Problem mit Antisemitinnen und Antisemiten’,” \textit{Antisemitismus in deutschen Parteien}; S. Salzborn, \textit{Die Linkspartei hat ein Antisemitismusproblem} (Die Welt, 08.06.2010); S. Salzborn and S. Voigt, “Antisemiten als Koalitionspartner? Die Linkspartei zwischen antizionistischem Antisemitismus und dem Streben nach Regierungsfähigkeit,” \textit{Zeitschrift für Politik} (3/58, 2011).}

Related incidents prove that certain parts of the party are still dominated by anti-Zionist attitudes. For instance, the politician Hermann Dierkes from the city of Duisburg repeatedly called for a boycott of Israel; the left-wing city counsellor Erika Zemaitis rejected the subsidization of the reconstruction of the synagogue in Herford that was destroyed by the Nazi regime; furthermore, in 2008, eleven delegates of the party were absent during the vote concerning a proposal to fight antisemitism (shortly before the 70\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the \textit{Reichspogromnacht}), because they conceptually equated solidarity with Israel with a form of taboo to criticize Israeli politics.\footnote{Cf. M. W. Kloke, “Antisemitismus in der Linkspartei: ‘DIE LINKE hat ein Problem mit Antisemitinnen und Antisemiten’,” \textit{Antisemitismus in deutschen Parteien}, 162.} The politicians Annette Groth, Inge Höger and Norman Paech participated in the so-called \textit{Gaza flotilla raid} in May 2010. The legitimization of the latter was questioned by large parts of the media. Relativization of terror and fraternization with Hamas and Hezbollah could be observed at demonstrations initiated by the party, in which left-wing and Islamist groups showed their hostility toward Israel together with extreme right-wing actors.\footnote{Cf. T. Haury, “Der neue Antisemitismusstreit der deutschen Linken,” \textit{Neuer Antisemitismus? Eine globale Debatte}, 151. For statements relativizing terror of DIE LINKE politician Christine Buchholz cf. M. W. Kloke, “Antisemitismus in der Linkspartei: ‘DIE LINKE hat ein Problem mit Antisemitinnen und Antisemiten’,” \textit{Antisemitismus in deutschen Parteien}, 160.} Former head of the DIE LINKE parliamentary group, Oskar Lafontaine (as well as Norman Paech), repeatedly expressed understanding for the Iranian nuclear program.\footnote{Cf. M. W. Kloke, “Antisemitismus in der Linkspartei: ‘DIE LINKE hat ein Problem mit Antisemitinnen und Antisemiten’,” \textit{Antisemitismus in deutschen Parteien}, 169pp.).}

Obviously, one shall, at this point, not forget the commitment of politicians from the party DIE LINKE such as Petra Pau and Gregor Gysi. Kloke summarized these accomplishments (cf. M. W. Kloke, “Antisemitismus in der Linkspartei: ‘DIE LINKE hat ein Problem mit Antisemitinnen und Antisemiten’,” \textit{Antisemitismus in deutschen Parteien}, 169pp.).
Yet, not only within DIE LINKE, but also among other left-wing, autonomous movements and non-governmental organisations, one can find tendencies to treat antisemitism as a merely historically relevant phenomenon and consequently – intentionally or not – justify demonization as well as delegitimization of Israel, since criticism of the latter cannot constitute antisemitism.82

During events of the nowadays no longer relevant anti-globalization movement attac and the Trotskyist group Linksruck, Israel was repeatedly characterized as “fascist”. Here again, the “heroic fighters of the intifada”83 were praised and supporters called for the boycott of Israeli goods.84 Through the often-used comparison between international financial capital and national community/ies, economic processes are simplified; furthermore, such schemes activate patterns that are mainly known from the right-wing nationalism or völkisch anti-capitalism.85 This way

anti-Zionist attitudes within the anti-globalization movement as well as in the peace movement provide ideological points of reference for anti-Israeli argumentation from the extreme right or Islamist side.86

In summary, it can be stated that anti-Zionism, justified by a simplified anti-imperialist worldview, has been constantly expressed in the GDR and in left-wing milieus of the FRG, in particular since 1967. Leftist groups have been characterizing Israel as the ultimate evil, as the henchman or even as the secret string-pulling puppet master of US imperialism. They reproduce antisemitic stereotypes, projective-exonerative analogies and therefore demonize and delegitimize the Jewish state. In the following chapter, I will shortly illustrate the linguistic patterns of the repertoire used to devalue Israel and consequently, the Jews.

82 Yet, statistical surveys such as the renowned FES-Mitte-Study from 2016 show that the presence of antisemitism in the left-wing milieu has to be classified according to the so-called political centre and the right-wing spectrum: “Classic antisemitism is exhibiting an almost linear increase (extreme left-wing 0 %, rather left-wing 1 %, centre 7 %, rather right-wing 14 %, extreme right-wing 16 %). The same holds true for Israel-related antisemitism (extreme left-wing 14 %, rather left-wing 16 %, centre 23 %, rather right-wing 43 %, extreme right-wing 46 %)” (A. Zick, B. Küpper and D. Krause, Gespaltene Mitte – Feindselige Zustände: Rechtextreme Einstellungen in Deutschland 2016, ed. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, R. Melzer (Bonn: Dietz, 2016), 64.

83 The fraternization with Palestinians can even go so far that some anti-imperialists see Hamas as a partner and suicide bombers as martyrs that are fighting a justified battle (see statements in Linksruck, cit. in T. Haury, “Der neue Antisemitismusstreit der deutschen Linken,” Neuer Antisemitismus? Eine globale Debatte, 143 and 148p.).

84 Ibid. 155.

85 Ibid. 156.

4. Patterns of language use and their communicative functions

As I showed previously in chapter 3, anti-Zionism functions as a pivotal ideological justification as well as the carrier of antisemitism on the left. This function of anti-Zionism gets commonly characterized through the metaphor of a “Trojan horse” 87. Thus, antisemitism (not only) on the left can be communicated in an “honorable” 88 way, i.e. as a verbal offense against injustice, oppression, and exploitation.

As it was mentioned before, anti-Zionism is based on an anti-imperialist world-view that is determined by categories such as *Manichaeism, personification, conspiracy theories* and an *extreme reference to “the people”*. 89 Furthermore, I have added the following categories into Haury’s synopsis: *stereotypes* 90, Nazi comparisons as well as further (partly historical) comparisons. 91 All these categories constitute the anti-Zionist repertoire of demonization. Due to lack of space, I can take only a few examples of the complex patterns of language use into consideration, which, in their respective turns, constitute implicit forms of anti-Israel demonization. 92

Speakers construct the Middle Eastern conflict as a conflict in which – through a recourse to an anti-imperialist scheme (which presents a Manichaean world-view) – Palestinians play the role of the weak, the non-white oppressed, in need of help, who are fighting for their legitimate goals; Israel, though, plays the role of an oppressive, omnipotent, and illegitimate power: 93

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87 M. W. Kloke, *Zum Antisemitismus in der deutschen Linken*.
89 Cf. T. Haury, *Die ideologischen Grundlagen des Antizionismus in der Linken*.
90 The allegation of a Jewish world conspiracy constitutes only of many antisemitic stereotypes.
91 The aforementioned categories of Manichaesism and personification constitute parameters which can be completed with stereotypical meaning.
(1) The Palestinian resistance movement call to battle against the occupier (Süddeutsche Zeitung, reader’s comment, 07th of December 2017)

At the same time, commenters regard the presence of Palestinian life in the Middle East as something *natural*, while Israeli existence, however, is regarded as something *artificial*:

(2) My opinion is that the Jewish claim to Palestine doesn’t have a rational basis. The Arabs have lived in that region all along and so they are of course entitled to live there today. Their leaders have my full support to fight off the planned Zionist takeover! (taz, reader’s comment, 07th of December 2017)

It is striking that commenters often refer solely to the (usually demonized) Israeli Prime Minister or to the Zionist state, but not to the Israeli populace. The usage of the category *extreme reference to the people or humans* vis-à-vis Israelis would demand the concession that Jewish citizens also have the right to exist in the Middle East. Writers acknowledge group-related rights only in reference to the Palestinian side. The avoidance of such a reference to the Israeli populace also leads to the case where Jews are conceptually sidelined. Hence, left speakers can – through the loop of the “legitimizing excuse ‘Israel’” – demonize the reference group (partly in striking an aggressive tone), without being potentially confronted with the reproach of reproducing misanthropic, in this particular case, antisemitic hate speech, which of course would not be compatible within a leftist self-conception.

In parallel with this abstractly-avoiding reference to Israeli citizens in the anti-Zionist discourse, speakers personify the concept of the enemy, Israel. As indicated above, the personification of Israel often introduces the reproduction of antisemitic stereotypes. According to this observation, the commenter in the next example, a journalist of the junge Welt, reproduces the stereotype of VENGEPFULNESS as a characteristic of the personified Israel:

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94 This outlook corresponds to the typical right-wing construction of an autochthonous German people on the one and the international Jewry which is incapable of nation building on the other side (cf. T. Haury, “Der neue Antisemitismusstreit der deutschen Linken,” Neuer Antisemitismus? Eine globale Debatte, 150).

95 Ibid. 148.


As soon as speakers reproach Israeli ability to put up with a fight, they direct that reproach not only towards Israelis, but also towards Jews in the commentator’s own country (and worldwide). Through the oscillating usage of the lexemes Zionists, Israelis and Jews (which are understood as synonyms), they (unsubstantially) equate these groups. The first ones are often explicitly named, the latter one, however, only implied. In the frame of such a perspective, German Jews get forced in a position of justification pressure as soon as the Middle Eastern conflict escalates again.
With old Testament right, Israel cracks down on the Palestinian rebellion in the occupied territories. An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. And that is clearly an understatement. An eye for hundred eyes, and a tooth for hundred teeth, that’s the invoice.  

Next to the stereotype of VENGEFULNESS, writers in the left milieu frequently refer to GREED FOR MONEY. They can utter such an allegation explicitly, when they speak of „greedy Jews;” or implicitly coded, when they speak of „the finance capital” or „the Wall Street”. In the present-day discourse, this stereotype in its actualized form gets transferred onto Israel – a country that allegedly is greedy for land: 

Historically, Jerusalem belongs to the Palestinians. In 1947, there was a clear arrangement of who gets what. But for Israel that wasn’t enough. It wants more and more. 

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, reader’s comment, 6th of December 2017) 

In the context of this stereotype, writers often express world conspiracy theories. In the 20th century, related theories entered the left discourse through the allegations such as „Zionist multimillionaires who […] repeatedly meet at private conferences in order to support Israel’s aggression”. Today, such constructions also appear in moderate, left-liberal media (cf. e.g. Jakob Augstein’s columns presented in chapter 3). In the following bit, a reader of Süddeutsche Zeitung accuses Israel (again personified) of destabilizing the region of the Middle East and of being responsible for the refugee crisis (and therefore for the current destabilization of the European Union and Germany):

Israel displaces people, those flee by the millions to other countries. Consequently, these countries got destabilized and through Zionist/imperialist cover-ups pushed into a civil war – even more people have to flee, this time towards Europe, and lo and behold, the number of Muslims in Europe raises disproportionately. Basically only a Zionist conspiracy in order to weaken Europe, especially the evil Germany. (Süddeutsche Zeitung, reader’s comment, 6th of December 2017)

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In the context of the Occupy Wall Street movement related reminiscences are articulated as well. Here, references to Rothschild (as a symbol of Jewish influence) are rarely made, instead such an explicit reference got replaced by naming Goldman Sachs and a sinister East Coast lobby operating behind the scenes (for an analysis of such paraphrases cf. M. Schwarz-Friesel and J. Reinharz, Inside the Antisemitic Mind: The Language of Jew-Hatred in Contemporary Germany, 10). 

Hence, an imaginary is chosen that is accessible to an antisemitic interpretation of the world. While criticizing banks and economic sectors, speakers also use locust metaphors (which represents a pattern with a long history) and activate a scenario of menace, in which “locusts” pounce on defenseless consumers, destroy economic states and in fact, going as far plunging the whole states into chaos. 

Furthermore, writers in the present-day discourse on the Mideast conflict reproduce stereotypes of DECEIT and HYPOCRISY and – in conjunction with these – the INSTRUMENTALISATION OF ANTISEMITISM:

(6) Israel claims, Hamas would have “killed” an Israeli soldier und start to shoot at Palestinian territory. (*Die Zeit*, reader’s comment, 3rd of August 2014)

(7) While other countries deal with their (admittedly often bigger) conflicts by force, Israel categorically whines, screams, and wails, emphasizing that they’d have the right, because of antisemitism (*Die Zeit*, reader’s comment, 4th of August 2014)

(8) Israel’s behavior [is] comparable with the one of a beaten child [...]. The Jews have suffered for centuries, and now they themselves spread misery in their self-created ghetto. (*Die Zeit*, reader’s comment, 29th of November 2012)

The latter comment shows the paternalistic allegation that Israel would behave like a child and therefore is – in the political arena – BACKWARD. Additionally, the commenter strikingly uses the lexeme „ghetto”. This is an allusion to the Nazi crimes and therefore an implicit comparison between Israel and Nazi Germany.¹⁰¹ I’ve already pointed out that ever since the German left (i.e. in both German states, GDR and FRG) express(ed) Nazi comparisons on a regular basis (cf. chapter 3). Such comparisons can be realized rather explicitly, by word play like *Nazisrael* or *Zionazis*.¹⁰² In the previous chapter, I also demonstrated indirect forms of exonerative antisemitism, not least with the aid of articles written by well-established journalists such as Gräfin Dönhoff as well as Rudolf and Jakob Augstein.

Instead of listing examples of my linguistic data, in which writers utter Nazi comparisons, I’d rather refer to the three communicative functions¹⁰³ that accompany Nazi comparisons, which constitute the essence of exonerative antisemitism: Through the use of Nazi comparisons, Israel gets demonized (in the course of a so-called perpetrator-victim-reversal); beyond that, Nazi crimes are deprived of their singular status and consequently relativized. If the writer is a

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¹⁰¹ Cf. M. J. Becker, *Analogien der “Vergangenheitsbewältigung”: Projektionen von historischen Verbrechen auf Israel in Leserkommentaren der “Zeit” und des “Guardian”*, 80; L. Giesel, *NS-Vergleiche und NS-Metaphern im öffentlichen Kommunikationsraum sowie in E-Mails an die Israelische Botschaft und den Zentralrat der Juden in Deutschland: Korpuslinguistische Perspektiven auf konzeptuelle, strukturelle und funktionale Charakteristika.* It is an implicit Nazi comparison, because the commenter activates the Nazi scenario only through using the lexeme „ghetto”. An explicit Nazi comparison would mean: Israel is/acts like Nazi Germany (*X is like Y*).


¹⁰³ When I use the term (communicative) function(s), I refer to deductions that can be inferred out of the given information regarding the proportion of the two correlated issues. Readers can, but they don’t have to be able to infer these potential deductions. This means that the actual understanding of the analogies can diverge subjectively. Questions such as, whether the writer utters a comparison intentionally, or if readers can entirely understand the comparison, do not, however, affect the functions of analogies in that context.
member of the German in-group (i.e. that of the former perpetrators), the relativization of Nazi crimes is accompanied by an unburdening of guilt from the writer’s own national community. Hence, Israel serves as a projection surface for characteristics that are opposed to a positive collective self-image (the Holocaust is, for many Germans, the largest impediment to this sort of affinity with national identity). The unburdening of guilt allows a discursive overcoming of the historically bad conscience that prevents individuals from having a sincere identification with their national identity.\(^\text{104}\) Within the course of Nazi comparisons (as a form of Israel-related demonization) the above-mentioned category of an extreme reference to the people gets activated – similarly to (as we have discussed before in the beginning of this chapter) the Manichean scheme, where interpreting the world images of what is good and what is bad, gets reinforced. Yet, in this case the positive image does not affect other (per se positively evaluated) peoples, but specifically the own people of the Germans.

The reconstruction of a need for unburdening of guilt of the German in-group that accompanies Nazi comparisons is rather striking in the context of leftist groups. After all, the left internationalism takes nationhood as an anachronistic identity promoting concept. As a result, leftist groups think of themselves as being free of national sentiment and, thus, of needs for exoneration and national self-identification.\(^\text{105}\) The frequent, almost obsessive presence of Nazi comparisons demonstrates, however, overlaps between different political camps in Germany in relation to their needs as soon as the Nazi past and antisemitism are the issue.

The relation to the people also gets activated or expanded via a (from the above-mentioned Manichean world-view predefined) positive relation of leftist groups to national liberation movements – in case of anti-Zionist utterances the positive relation to the Palestinians.\(^\text{106}\) Leftist anti-Zionists express such a perspective whilst vehemently rejecting at the same time the existence of the Israeli state. This double standard finally results in a delegitimization of Israel\(^\text{107}\):


\(^\text{106}\) Cf. chapter 3 and M. W. Kloke, *Zum Antisemitismus in der deutschen Linken.*

\(^\text{107}\) A delegitimization of the Israeli state obviously appears in the course of each category presented in this article that as a whole constitutes the anti-Zionist repertoire of demonization.
Such a double standard can, however, also occur, when writers apply especially high moral standards to Israel. This is characteristic for anti-Israeli manifestations coming from the left-liberal camp: writers take the view that Israelis and/or Jews would not have learned anything from the past of persecution of the Jews. On the other side, there are the German (non-Jewish) writers who – not least because of their presumed historical sensitivity (that they tend to express e.g. via Nazi comparisons) – would have learned from the (Nazi) past and therefore hold an exemplary role. Accordingly, they perceive themselves as morally superior to Israelis and/or Jews. Double standards come inter alia into effect, when writers reproach Israel that confronted with terrorism, the country defends itself, and suggest pacifism, indulgence, and de-escalation.

In the example introduced above from the *junge Welt*, the reference to Israel as an „apartheid state“ is of interest. This is one among those historical comparisons, through which anti-Zionism can be characterized as well. The reference to apartheid shows Israel as a state with a fully established, institutionalized segregation between Israelis and Palestinians. The above-mentioned functions of demonization (of Israel) and relativization (of racist crimes of the South African apartheid regime) can be witnessed here as well.

The apartheid represents a product of European colonialism that in its late form is shaped by (justifying) racist positions. A demonization of Israel through comparisons to apartheid, colonialism, expansionism, militarism and chauvinism represent standardized distortions of Israel and of Zionism in leftist contexts. In the course of historical comparisons (next to the one of apartheid especially with the European colonial empires in mind), in which European crimes are projected onto Israel, writers reinforce the Manichean world-view of the anti-imperialist anti-Zionism and consequently justify their own rejection of the Israeli state.

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110 Cf. ibid.; M. W. Kloke, *Zum Antisemitismus in der deutschen Linken*.
111 The advantage of such demonizing (and relativizing of historical crimes) comparisons is that speakers devalue and ostracize Israel without using antisemitic stereotypes. They therefore represent a form of anti-Zionist expressions that leftist speakers can utter without being labelled as antisemitic (cf. M. J. Becker, *Analogien der „Vergangenheitsbewältigung“*: Projektionen von historischen Verbrechen auf Israel in Leserkommentaren der „Zeit“ und des „Guardian“).
A central concomitant phenomenon of anti-imperialist anti-Zionism is the one of anti-Americanism. The rejection of the US, which works as the prototype of capitalism and imperialism per se, gets interlinked with anti-Zionist conceptualizations that are unambiguously pre-defined by conspiracy-theory explanations and a clear idea of good and bad. In the present-day discourse, such a conceptualization gets conveyed in the idea of the „Wall Street as the worldwide center of power of the Jewish finance capital“. In relation to Israel, an anti-American resentment is expressed when (as mentioned in chapter 3) writers depict the Israeli state as a „bridgehead“ or „spearhead“ or as the „agency of American imperialism“ in the Middle East. Writers also allege a Jewish-Zionist control over the US (or the US president) as soon as the US government makes a decision in favor of Israeli interests:

(10) It is Payday for Trump, he has to act and this is what he did. The Jewish-Zionist donors take their toll. And it doesn’t matter to him if the region [of the Mideast] burns. (Süddeutsche Zeitung, reader’s comment, 7th of December 2017)

Frequent allegations of an Israeli-US-American plot demonstrate the compatibility of anti-semitism and anti-Americanism within the frame of an anti-imperialist world-view.

Patterns of language use are shaped by the motifs and ideological background of writers. They can convey their conceptualizations introduced above in an explicit manner, which is often the case, when it comes to utterances of the radical left. Hence, writers use superlative („the worst dictatorship in the world“, „one of the most violent and militarized societies in the world“) and request the destruction of Israel.

Moderate representatives of a left-minded thinking, however, can convey Israel-related demonization implicitly (inter alia via rhetorical questions, advices, admonitions) and/or embedded into socially acceptable patterns of argumentation. Hence, instead of radical claims to destroy Israel, writers propose a secularization of Israel and/or the birth of a multi-ethnic

114 L. Rensmann, Demokratie und Judenbild: Antisemitismus in der politischen Kultur der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 309.
state. Yet, with the aid of knowledge regarding the high amount of destructive antisemitism within certain Muslim communities (not only) in the Middle East these days, readers can imply that both speech acts – aggressive request as well as constructive advice – would guide to the same consequences for Jewish life in the Middle East. The advantage of the second variant of course is that due to its subtle nature, it is accessible in debates of the political mainstream. The examples shown in chapter 3 and 4, however, prove that (not least because of the anonymity guaranteed by the Internet) an implicit and/or elaborate nature even in left-liberal milieus, and therefore in the mainstream, are not anymore unconditional requirements for the expression of antisemitic attitudes – such processes might redeem explicit verbal antisemitism from its presence as a phenomenon of marginal groups.

5. Conclusion and outlook

In both German states, anti-Zionism – justified by an anti-imperialist world-view – was established at an early stage, especially after 1967. This ideology represents a simplistic interpretation of the world, in which Israel always plays the role of the ultimate evil; via projective-exonerating analogies, writers additionally depict the Jewish state as a return of German and/or European crimes as well as a partner of the repelled US-imperialism. In the course of this role assignment, which is embedded in an unequivocal black-and-white scenario, writers can (among other forms of demonization) transfer antisemitic stereotypes onto Israel.

The abovementioned patterns guide us to numerous contradictions within a leftist world-view as well as moral convictions, that representatives of the related milieus otherwise obviously avoid or do not anticipate, such as: 1.) degradation and ostracism of a certain group that are accompanied by the reproduction of antisemitic stereotypes; 3.) the relativization of crimes in the German and European past through Nazi and other historical comparisons; 4.) as a consequence of such a relativization (in case of Nazi comparisons), an unburdening of the German national in-group and thus a strengthening of national self-images of Germans; 4.) no matter if the comparisons are related to the German, the Palestinian or other peoples (that are depicted as oppressed) – comparisons of that kind presume an almost uncritical-affirmative relation to the people.

On the surface and in spite of such contradictions, one can speak of an attractiveness of anti-Zionism that arises out of its „rhetorical flexibility“119. First off, writers can renounce familiar

patterns of explicit hostility toward Jews. They can claim that their “criticism” only applies to
the Jewish state, is based on humanistic principles and therefore cannot have any antisemitic
basis. Furthermore, their criticism is tabooed out of a misunderstood historical responsibil-
ity. Following this argumentation, not antisemitism, but the reproach of antisemitism against
the leftist writers gets scandalized.

By means of the anti-Zionist camouflage, antisemitic tropes can infiltrate the mainstream of
the German society. Even if explicit anti-Zionist utterances, as they come from the radical left
do get problematized, patterns of language use among left-liberal milieus can lead to the
point, where antisemitic stereotypes (and other forms of demonization) can reach the status of
what is permissible to say. That makes them significantly more dangerous than explicit, tra-
tional forms of verbal Jew-hatred, which only have a limited appeal within the mainstream
society. Despite linguistic differences, the conceptual basis – the rejection of everything that
is Jewish – remains and can become acceptable to the majority. In this respect, the analysis of
socially acceptable forms of antisemitic hate speech must be brought to the fore of present-
day antisemitism research.

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